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In 1994, the French railway worker – or cheminot – Léon Bronchart was made a Righteous 
Amongst the Nations. The Righteous Amongst the Nations is an award granted by Yad Vashem 
since its creation in the 1950s, and it aims to commemorate those non-Jews who helped Jews 
during the Holocaust.1 In this case, Bronchart was honoured for three reasons: he helped his 
neighbours, the Rosenberg family, during the German Occupation; he hid a Jew fleeing from the 
French Milice in a train; and he refused to drive a convoy of Jewish deportees in late 1942.2 It is 
for this last reason that Bronchart is most celebrated. In fact, he is referred to by some as the 
only cheminot who refused to take part in the genocide: ‘Léon Bronchart, the ‘exemplary 
cheminot’ (…) He is the only cheminot who is ‘Righteous Amongst the Nations’, the only 
mechanic who refused to drive a locomotive pulling a train of deportees.’3 But if it is often 
claimed that Léon Bronchart refused to drive a train of Jewish deportees, he in fact states in his 
memoirs that the train he refused to drive on 31 October 1942 in Montauban station contained 
political prisoners – not Jews.4 This completely changes the significance attributed to his gesture. 
Indeed, the requirement for becoming a Righteous is that one must have been aware that the 
people s/he were saving were Jewish.5 Bronchart was certainly aware that his neighbours, the 
Rosenbergs, were Jewish, and he might also have been aware that the man he hid in his 
locomotive was Jewish. The claim that he refused to drive a ‘Jewish’ convoy, however, is a 
misrepresentation of the actual events. 
 
The example of Léon Bronchart paints a more complicated picture of the Righteous than is often 
presumed, and in doing so contributes to an emerging literature which re-examines the role of 
rescue in the Holocaust.6 As Sarah Gensburger explained in the opening of her book on the 
                                                            
1 Sarah Gensburger, Les Justes de France (Paris: Sciences Po, 2010) 20-1. For more information on 
Mordechai Shenhabi and Yad Vashem, see Ran Zwigenberg, Hiroshima: The Origins of Global Memory Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 61-3. 
2 Yad Vashem Archives, Paris: Dossier n°6354, Léon Bronchart. The story of Léon Bronchart is fully 
developed in the Epilogue of my upcoming book, Ordinary Workers: French Railwaymen, Vichy and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge University Press), which will be translated and published in French with Tallandier. 
3 Alain Lipietz, ‘Léon Bronchart, juste, ouvrier et soldat’ (22 September 2007), 
http://lipietz.net/?breve259. 
4 Jewish convoys were being driven from Southern France to Drancy in the summer and autumn of 1942, 
and although some went via Montauban, known train schedules would suggest it is unlikely that that 
particular train carried Jews.   
5 There are four basic conditions for receiving this award, one of which underlines that the ‘initial 
motivation’ must be ‘the intention to help persecuted Jews’. Thus, if one does not realise that the victims 
being persecuted are Jewish, one cannot claim this award. See the Yad Vashem website for more 
information: http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/faq.asp#criteria. 
6 The historiography on rescue and the Righteous in the Holocaust has truly taken off since the 2000s: 
Yisrael Gutman, Efraim Zuroff, eds., Rescue attempts during the Holocaust: proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem 
International Conference, Jerusalem April 8-11, 1974 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977); Lucien Lazare, Le livre des 
Justes: histoire du sauvetage des juifs par des non-juifs en France, 1940-1944 (Paris: J.C. Lattès, 1993); Israel Gutman, 
et. al., The encyclopedia of the righteous among the nations: rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad 
Vashem, 2003); Hubert Hannoun, L’épopée des Justes de France (Paris: Connaissances et Savoirs, 2004); Pearl 
Justes, or the Righteous, rescue is undoubtedly a key part of the story of the Holocaust, and 
gentile rescuers of Jews have always featured within it. Indeed, when Yad Vashem was created as 
The Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrace Authority in 1953, it was conceived around 
the ideas of Mordechai Shenhabi who sought to commemorate both the Jewish victims and the 
non-Jewish rescuers.7 The Righteous have since become much more widely known across the 
globe, especially since the 1990s Holocaust memory boom. Schindler’s List (1993), the canonical 
Holocaust film directed by Steven Speilberg, was based precisely on the story of a Righteous, 
Oscar Schindler, whose actions led to the rescue of hundreds of Jews facing persecution.8 In 
2007, a commemorative plaque for the French Righteous – or Justes de France – was placed in the 
Pantheon crypt, a site in central Paris where all the ‘Great’ French men (and a small handful of 
women) are buried, including the resistance hero Jean Moulin.9 In 2010, a bronze statue of 
Nicholas Winton, the ‘British Schindler’ who saved over 600 Jewish children during the war, was 
unveiled at Maidenhead railway station.10 Contemporary rituals to commemorate these Righteous 
men and women are thus part of daily life in Britain, France, America, and Europe more 
broadly.11 
 
However, there are some problems with the popular representations of rescue and the Righteous. 
First, the centrality the Righteous to Holocaust history and memory can be overplayed. Scholars 
in the past decade have sought to redress these interpretations of the Righteous, and to show that 
the survival of Jews during the Holocaust cannot be explained solely by the intervention of 
gentiles.12 It was, first and foremost, an effort of survival from the victims themselves. It was also 
a network of assistance and support amongst the Jewish communities scattered across Europe. 
And one must not forget the geo-political factors which significantly shaped chances of survival 
                                                                                                                                                                          
M. Oliner, Saving the forsaken: religious culture and the rescue of Jews in Nazi Europe (New Haven, Conn.; London: 
Yale University Press, 2004); Yagil Limor, ‘Rescue of Jews: Between History and Memory’, Humboldt Journal 
of Social Relations, Vol. 28, n.2 (2004); Patrick Henry, We only know men: the rescue of Jews in France during the 
Holocaust (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007); Jacques Sémelin, Claire Andrieu 
& Sarah Gensburger, La résistance aux genocides: de la pluralité des actes de sauvetage (Paris: Presses de la 
Fondation des sciences politiques, 2008); Levana Frenk, Righteous among the nations in France and Belgium: a 
silent resistance (Jérusalem: Yad Vashem, 2008); Suzanne Vormen, Hidden children of the Holocaust: Belgian nuns 
and their daring rescue of young Jews from the Nazis (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Limor 
Yagil, La France, terre de refuge et de désobéissance civile (1936-1944) (Paris: Cerf, 2010); Jacques Sémelin, 
Persécutions et entraides dans la France occupée: comment 75% des Juifs en France ont échappé à la mort (Paris: Seuil, 
2013). 
7 Sarah Gensburger, Les Justes de France (Paris: Sciences Po 2010), 20-1. 
8 Several books and articles raise the issues which traverse the film: Terrence Rafferty, ‘A Man of 
Transactions’ (review of Schindler’s List), New Yorker, 20 Dec 1993; Y. Loshitzky, Spielberg’s Holocaust 
(1997); Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘ “Schindlers’s List” is not “Shoah”: The Second Commandment, Popular 
Modernism and Public Memory’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 22, n°2, Winter 1996; Tim Cole, Images of the Holocaust 
(1999) ‘Chapter 3: Oskar Schindler’; Karyn Ball, ‘For and against the Bilderverhot: The Rhetoric of 
‘Unrepresentability’ and Remediated ‘Authenticity’ in the German Reception of Steven Spielberg’s 
Schindler’s List’ in Bathrick, et.al., Visualizing the Holocaust: documents, aesthetics, memory (2008) 
9 Mona Ozouf, ‘Le Panthéon’ in Pierre Nora, ed., Les lieux de Mémoire, Vol.1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); 
Béatrice Gurrey, ‘Jacques Chirac fait entrer les Justes au Panthéon et invite la France à regarder son histoire 
"en face"’, Le Monde (18 Janvier 2007), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2007/01/18/jacques-
chirac-fait-entrer-les-justes-au-pantheon_856858_3224.html.  
10 ‘Statue for ‘British Schindler’ Sir Nicholas Winton’, BBC News Berkshire (18 September 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-berkshire-11356875. 
11 Some events, however, are more problematic than others. Recent efforts to commemorate the Polish 
‘Righteous’ have caused a lot of controversy: Donald Snyder, ‘Poland’s Dueling Holocaust Monuments to 
‘Righteous Gentiles’ Spark Painful Debate’, The Jewish Daily Forward (2 May 2014) 
http://forward.com/articles/197120/polands-dueling-holocaust-monuments-to-righteous-g/?p=all.   
12 Recent works have been particularly helpful in challenging certain assumptions and preconceptions of 
rescue: Sarah Gensburger, Les Justes de France: politiques publiques de la mémoire (Paris: Presses Sciences Po, 
2010); Bob Moore, Survivors: Jewish Self-Help and Rescue in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Patrick Cabanel, L’Histoire des Justes de France (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012);  Susan 
Zuccotti, Père Marie-Benoît and Jewish rescue: how a French priest together with Jewish friends saved thousands during the 
Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
across Europe and North Africa.13 The Righteous do not necessarily fit within these stories. 
Second, there is a tendency to reduce those who lived in the Second World War into two 
categories: one was either a Righteous – those who ‘incarnated the honour of France, its valued 
for justice, tolerance and humanity’14 – or not. Should this imply that the non-Righteous did not 
incarnate French values? Had no sense of justice, tolerance or humanity? In many ways this 
categorisation of rescuers and non-rescuers mirrors the postwar resistance myth which saw 
society divided into resisters or non-resisters, and it reminds us of the ongoing assumption that 
moral lessons can – and must – be drawn from the Second World War, and particularly from the 
Holocaust. Not only that, but the commemoration of rescue is often inflated with political 
and/or national rhetoric, not least in the French case.15 As the quote above showed, the Justes 
symbolised French values. Recent studies of rescue go beyond these simplistic categorisations, 
and they engage with the historical complexities of rescue in the Holocaust, thereby showing a 
far more complex story of power, struggle, self-advancement, spontaneity, humanism, empathy, 
exploitation, political affiliation, social class.  
 
Bronchart’s story engages with these broad debates around the history and memory of rescue, 
but it also raises specific questions about rescue in railway deportations. Indeed, his story 
resonates within the recent polemic which has surrounded the SNCF since the 1990s regarding 
its role in the Jewish deportations. The French National Railway Company – the SNCF – has 
come under very harsh criticism for their role in deporting over 76,000 Jews from France.16 One 
of the side-effects of this polemic has been that cheminots working for the SNCF at the time 
have been judged for not refusing to take part in the deportations, or for not sabotaging the 
Jewish convoys. Why had French cheminots ‘managed widespread, organised resistance to all 
kinds of German demands – except deportations east’?17 Some contrast this absence of rescue 
with Bronchart’s refusal to drive a convoy, including the academic Michael Curtis who claimed 
that ‘only one SNCF worker, Léon Bronchart, refused on October 31, 1942, to work on a 
convoy.’18 Yet to what extent is Bronchart’s story representative of the historical realities of 
railway workers, rescue and the deportation trains? To what extent does this story reveal anything 
about the relationship(s) between railwaymen and Jews during the Holocaust? 
 
This article considers that Bronchart’s legacy is not only a misrepresentation of the actual 
historical events, but it is also a rare occurrence in the railway milieu at the time. Indeed, the 
question of rescue in the Holocaust is far more complex, as is the relationship between French 
railwaymen, Jews and the deportations. This article thus looks beyond the Bronchart story and 
explores the different historical contexts which help to better understand these questions and 
                                                            
13 Mark Mazower emphasised the significance of geography when examining the massacres of Jews in the 
Soviet Union territories in 1941. Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: 
Penguin Books, 2009) 178.   
14 Speech by Jacques Chirac, 18 January 2007, Paris, http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/fr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Comm%C3%A9moration-des-Justes-de-France-au-Panth%C3%A9on.pdf  
15 See Sarah Gensburger, Les Justes de France (Paris: Sciences Po 2010). 
16 The author gave a paper on the ‘SNCF Affair’ at the Lessons and Legacies conference in 2012. The paper 
will be published in the conference series, volume XII, in November 2016. A more detailed discussion of 
the Affair also appears in the Epilogue of the author’s upcoming monograph, Ordinary Workers. Currently, 
the best academic sources on the topic include Annette Wieviorka, ‘La Shoah, la SNCF et le juge’, 
L’Histoire n°316 (January 2007); Georges Ribeill, ‘SNCF et Déportations’, Historail n°4 (January 2008); 
Michael Marrus, ‘The Case of the French Railways and the Deportation of Jews in 1944,’ eds., David 
Bankier and Dan Michman, Holocaust and Justice: Representation and Historiography of the Holocaust in Post-War 
Trials (Jerusalem, 2010), 245-64. 
17 Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 331-332. See also Annie Kriegel, Réflexion sur les questions juives (Paris: Hachette, 
1984); Françoise Laborde, Ca va mieux en le disant (Paris: J’ai lu, 2009) 95-6. 
18 Author’s emphasis. Michael Curtis, Jews, Antisemitism and the Middle East (New Brunswick (USA): 
Transaction Publishers (2013) 122. For similar comments, see also Benjamin Ivry, The Jewish Daily Forward 
(16 March 2012) http://forward.com/articles/152642/time-to-come-clean-on-shoah-role/?p=all; Antoine 
Rappoport, ‘Civilian vs French State and French Railroad Company : a justice awaited for 60 years’, The 
Romanian Jewish Community website (undated) http://www.romanianjewish.org/en/index_fcer2.html. 
relationships. In doing so, it challenges traditional assumptions around cheminots’ attitudes 
towards the deportations in general, and to the Jews in particular. It also reveals the general issues 
surrounding rescue and deportation during the Second World War. 
 
In order to fully address this question, we must also take into consideration cheminots’ reactions 
to the deportation of non-Jews, as well as the reactions of the general population to both Jewish 
and non-Jewish deportations. This is for several reasons. First, as it will be shown in this article, 
the population at the time did not necessarily distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish 
persecution. In the early 1940s, most people in France did not understand the specificity of 
Jewish deportations or repression; rather, they assimilated it to other forms of repression 
throughout France, not least of communists, resisters and workers. The story of rescue in the 
deportations must, therefore, be seen with this in mind. Second, although the two biggest data 
works on the deportations from France during the Second World War make a clear distinction 
between group deportation transports of Jews and non-Jews, experiences of deportation were 
not so neatly divided.19 Whilst the division between racial and non-racial deportations is natural 
due to the unique circumstances of Jewish persecution and extermination, the experiences of 
physical deportation were not so clearly separable. The experience of a French resistor deported 
from Compiègne to Buchenwald in a convoy of over 1000 people was much more similar to that 
of a Jew deported from Drancy to Auschwitz, than to that of another French resistor deported 
from Gare de l’Est to a German prison in a traveller car guarded by two SS.20  Indeed, 
approximately thirty convoys seem to have been organised in conditions similar to the Jewish 
convoys, convoys of between 900-2000 deportees packed into sealed carriages with no 
distributions of food or water.21 The experiences of these internees in the camps was, of course, 
very different, since survival rates for Jews were so much lower. This naturally affects the 
availability of testimonies and memoirs. In contrast, the availability of non-Jewish sources helps 
to supplement the little information we have about cheminots’ roles in and reactions to the 
deportations. As this article will argue, what comes across in the archives is that cheminots 
reacted to Jewish and non-Jewish deportations in very similar ways: whilst most were horrified by 
the deportations, there are no records indicating any actual intervention or sabotage of these 
transports, no matter who they were carrying. The polemic around the indifference of French 
railway workers to Jewish convoys is thus a question of memory, not of history. 
 
This article aims to step away from these assumptions about rescue in Jewish railway 
deportations – those which glorify the acts of the Righteous Léon Bronchart, and by implication 
judge the absence of sabotage and defiance of other railway workers. Instead, it reveals the many 
realities which the railway community faced during the war, and how this shaped, or limited, their 
reactions to the railway deportations. First, it explains the relationship between the French and 
the deportations, showing in particular the limitations of cheminots’ knowledge and 
understanding of Jewish persecution specifically. Second, it outlines the reactions of railway 
workers to the deportations, Jewish but also non-Jewish. Indeed, although cheminots did not 
sabotage the trains or make grand rescue gestures during the deportations themselves, an 
enumeration of small gestures show a level of humanism, empathy and even at times rescue 
amongst the community. Finally, this article shifts its focus to actual rescue operations on 
deportation trains. How frequent were such operations? Who carried them out? Were 
railwaymen involved? The case under discussion will highlight the complicated logistical and 
diplomatic processes necessary behind such operations, processes which were beyond the control 
of railway workers. 
 
                                                            
19 One book examines the deportations for racial reasons, whilst the other examines the deportations for 
non-racial reasons : Serge and Beate Klarsfeld, Mémorial de la déportation des Juifs de France (Paris: Serge et 
Béate Klarsfeld, 1978); Foundation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation (FMD), Livre-Mémorial des déportés de 
France arêtes par mesure de répression et dans certains cas par mesure de persécution 1940-1945, 4 vols. (Paris: Tirésias, 
2004). 
20 Find an example for each. 
21 Foundation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation (FMD), Livre-Mémorial des déportés de France arêtes par mesure 
de répression et dans certains cas par mesure de persécution 1940-1945, 4 vols. (Paris: Tirésias, 2004). 
 
 
CHEMINOTS, DEPORTATIONS AND THE JEWISH QUESTION  
 
Cheminots were involved in the deportation of almost 160,000 men, women and children were 
deported from France between 1941 and 1944, 76,000  of whom were deported on racial 
grounds (antisemitic persecution) and 83,000 on non-racial grounds (political prisoners, resisters, 
hostages). 22  In addition to this, one must consider the deportation of French workers to 
Germany, a process which began with the Relève in April 1942 and intensified with the 
implementation of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), the Forced Labour Service, in February 
1943. 23  But to what extent did cheminots distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish 
deportations? To what extent did they differentiate deportations linked to volunteer or forced 
labour, and deportations linked to Nazi policies of persecution, repression and genocide?  
 
 
The historiography of Vichy France has repeatedly shown that the deportations of workers for 
forced labour in Germany triggered widespread turmoil across France – at the time, they were 
probably the deportations which had the most impact on French society. It is perhaps not so 
surprising, therefore, that it is these deportations which saw the most popular active resistance. 
On 6 January 1943, in Montluçon, 120 workers had been designated to go to work in Germany. 
Before the departure, local people had spread a number of tracts and fliers to protest against this 
deportation. They managed to rally several thousand people who arrived at the station before the 
train was set to depart at one o’clock in the afternoon. While the protestors were singing patriotic 
songs and shouting slogans, dozens of designated forced labourers managed to escape from the 
train. Wehrmacht officials eventually arrived at the station, and the crowd dispersed immediately, 
leaving a handful of deportees in the train which began its journey eastwards.24 A similar incident 
took place in Mazamet in May 1943, when locals grouped around a train holding 2000 young 
men heading to Germany. But like in Montluçon, this only caused a minor delay to the 
transport.25 No cheminots were identified specifically at these demonstrations. 
 
These are the only active popular manifestations against the deportations which I have found 
reported in the archives; this does not, however, mean that the deportations of the 160,000 other 
people from France did not cause outrage. In fact, it is well known that the Jewish deportations 
of the summer of 1942 caused a wave of popular unrest in France. The prefect reports in 
particular show grass-roots disapproval over the deportation of children during that terrible 
summer.26 But as the summer came to an end, the rate of deportation dropped drastically, and so 
did public furore over the Jewish convoys. Indeed, in that summer alone, 45 of the 79 Jewish 
convoys left France.27 After October 1942, Jewish convoys were more evenly spread out, with 
only one or two leaving on a monthly basis towards the end of the occupation. In contrast, the 
forced labour transports and non-racial deportations significantly intensified after the summer of 
1942. Numerically, the emphasis of the deportations had shifted, and it is undoubtedly these 
deportations – especially of the STO – which would grip popular attention from then on. 
 
The shift in popular interest from Jewish to non-Jewish deportations can be partially explained 
by the changing pace of deportations after the Summer of 1942, but it must also be noted that 
                                                            
22 These numbers are rounded up from the statistics in the Klarsfeld and FMD publications. 
23 For more information see Patrice Arnaud, Les STO: histoire des Français requis en Allemagne nazie, 1942-45 
(Paris: CNRS editions, 2010). 
24 Charles Tillon, Les FTP (Paris: Julliard, 1962), pp. 212-213, cited in the Rapport Bachelier, ‘V.4.1, Les 
transports du STO’. 
25 Archives Départementales Haute Garonne: 1831 W 98, ‘Incident STO à Mazamet’, May 1943. 
26 Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz: La ‘solution finale’ de la question juive en France  (Paris: Fayard, 2001, first ed. 
1993); Michael R. and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1995, first ed. 1981). 
27 There are 79 canonical convoys, although a handful of other convoys were organised, see Klarsfeld’s 
Mémorial for more details.  
the deportations of Jews and non-Jews were not necessarily distinguished from one another. 
Indeed, it is absolutely fundamental that one recognises the lack of a clear understanding of the 
Jewish specificity amongst the processes of persecution in Vichy France. Of course information, 
news, and most of all rumours penetrated France far and wide about antisemitic persecution.28 
The clandestine papers regularly passed through SNCF installations – thrown from trains, 
distributed in the workshops, hidden in stations – mentioned the Jewish deportations. On 9 July 
1942, a French Communist Party (PCF) tract found in the Villeneuve-St-Georges workshops 
denounced the Jewish star: ‘Hitler’s brutes bring us back to the middle ages by showing their 
scandalous contempt for the human person’. 29 Another PCF tract was thrown from a train 
passing through Corbeil denouncing the ‘antisemitic campaigns of hitlerian cannibals’.30 On 
October 1942, copies of Combat were found circulating in the railway buildings, not least the 
edition which included one article describing how Vichy was handing over the ‘Jews, our 
brothers’, ‘like cattle to the German authorities’.31  
 
Even if tracts mentioned the Jewish deportations and persecution, they never underlined the 
specificity of their cause. The Humanité tract denounced the yellow star, but never understood its 
real origins : ‘The unanimity of the French people worries the invader, and that is why they are 
trying to divide (the French) by imposing a distinctive sign on the Jews. (…) the Hitlerians want 
to unleash hatred of the Jews in order to attenuate hatred of the boches.’32 Likewise, in Combat they 
assimilated the persecution of Jews to that of other groups : ‘All those who suffer from the 
Germans, whether Jewish or nor, communist or not, are our brothers.’ This confirms what 
Renée Poznanski has said: that the remarks about Jewish persecution fell into a wider discourse 
against the occupier. 33  In fact, even if the clandestine press denounced racial laws and 
persecutions, some still believed in the existence of a ‘Jewish problem’. An author in Combat 
rejected the idea of a ‘racial’ Jewish problem: there was no ‘racial’ problem in France, he claimed, 
since ‘many Jewish families lose their distinctive traits over the generations, and they disappear 
into the mass of the nation…’.34 These extracts are a strong reminder that for certain resisters, 
including Henry Frenay who ran Combat, there existed a ‘Jewish problem’, but one defined in 
purely French rather than Nazi terms.35   
 
The absence of Jewish specificity is also obvious in the clandestine cheminot press. The October 
1942 edition of the Tribune des Cheminots wrote that ‘after the massive arrests of Jews, they’ve now 
arrested en masse the old trade union delegates and leaders who had remained the valiant 
defenders of their comrades [all this] in the hope of intimidating the mass of workers who they 
come to tear away from their homes.’36 What is particularly important to underline here is how 
the case of the Jews is being discussed within the context of their workers’ condition. This is 
nothing exceptional: Renée Poznanaski and Annette Wieviorka have already underlined how 
communists discussed Jewish persecution in relation to their own political struggles.37 This is not 
only because they lacked a specific understanding of the Jewish question, but also because their 
clandestine press was targeting specific readers. Indeed, the subjects raised in the tracts were 
                                                            
28 This topic is briefly mentioned in another publication by the author, Ludivine Broch ‘Professionalism in 
the Final Solution: French Railway Workers and the Jewish Deportations 1942-1944,’ Contemporary European 
History 23.3 (2014) 359-81. However, it is here worth going into greater detail. 
29 SNCF/25/LM/258: (July 1942) ‘Les barbares hitlériens obligent les juifs à porter un signe distinctif’, 
undated and signed by the PCF. 
30 SNCF/25/LM/258: (August 1942) ‘A bas l’antisémitisme: Honneur aux camarades juifs morts pour la 
liberté et l’indépendance de la France’, written by the PCF. 
31 SNCF/25/LM/258: (Nov. 1942) Combat, n°35, Octobre 1942. 
32 SNCF : 25 LM 0258, ‘Les barbares Hitlériens …’. 
33 Renée Poznanski, Propagandes et Persécutions : la Résistance et le ‘problème juif’, 1940-1944 (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 
253. 
34 Ibid..  
35 Poznanski, Propagandes et Persécutions (2008) 195-6. 
36 SNCF/25/LM/258: (Dec. 1942) ‘Cheminots, opposez-vous aux départs en Allemagne’, La Tribune des 
cheminots, by the Organe du Comité Populaire Central des Cheminots, dated Octobre 1942. 
37 See introduction in Renée Poznanski, Propagandes et Persécutions : la Résistance et le ‘problème juif’, 1940-1944 
(Paris: Fayard, 2008); Annette Wieviorka, Ils étaient juifs, résistants, communistes (Paris: Denoël, 1986). 
aimed to touch on the immediate and intimate issues of its audience, issues which were often 
linked to locality, class, or profession. Poznanski further underlines that the authors of these 
tracts and publications wanted to avoid sensitive subjects which might divide rather than unite 
opinion. In that case, why not link the deportation of Jews to the deportation of workers? It was, 
after all, a means to an end. All the same, one should not overestimate the links between these 
deportations; more often than not, the cheminot press was referring exclusively to the STO 
deportations. 
 
It may come as a surprise to many that cheminots did not necessarily understand the specificity 
of the Jewish deportations – after all, they were working along the railways, and had a closer 
proximity to the deportees than the average Frenchman or even resister. But knowledge and 
understanding of the Holocaust in the early 1940s is a very tricky issue, and cheminots’ 
knowledge of the Jewish deportations should not be overestimated. First, ‘knowing’ and 
‘understanding’ were two entirely different things in the 1940s. People knew Jews were being 
deported; the large majority could not begin to imagine the nature of concentration and 
extermination camps. Denis Peschanski was already raising this issue in 1989: what did ‘savoir’ 
even mean in those days?38 Was it knowing that Jews were persecuted more than other groups? 
Was it to know that they left towards the East in atrocious conditions? Was it to know about the 
Nazis’ plans for their total extermination? Did ‘knowledge’ need to be total, or could it only be 
partial? We must also place these questions back into the unique geographical context of Western 
Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, where the ‘bloodlands’ of the Holocaust were located, 
the situation was very different: antisemitic persecution was more visible than in Western Europe 
(at least for a time), and the local population was regularly drawn into this persecution. It was 
thereby much more common to have a basic understanding of the fate of the Jews depending on 
geography.39 In contrast, the knowledge of the Holocaust in Western Europe, and particularly in 
France, was deeply fragmented and uncertain. As the journal of the young Jewish Parisian 
student, Hélène Berr, reveals, rumours were widespread but accurate knowledge was scarce.40 
Selecting and adding up some of this information in order to provide a coherent picture was very 
hard, especially for ordinary French people. Some might have been more acute to the dangers 
faced by Jews, if they lived in Paris, for instance, or witnessed roundups first hand. But still the 
risks faced by Jews were assimilated to those faced by other persecuted groups, and the 
specificity of the Nazi racial plan was largely unknown. 
 
Although there is no direct evidence, it is possible to get some understanding of how little 
ordinary cheminots knew about the Jewish convoys through a simple process of elimination and 
deduction. Indeed, the large majority of railway workers would never see a deportation train 
within their lifetime. This is for several reasons. First, the percentage of deportation convoys was 
very low in comparison to the total traffic flow of the railways. According to Serge Klarsfeld and 
Gérard Gobitz, 79 Jewish convoys left France between March 1942 and August 1944, and 17 
convoys transferred Jews from the Free to the Occupied Zone between June and October 
1942.41 In contrast, the monthly railway traffic consisted of tens of thousands of trains in a single 
month. Amidst this body of transport, the Jewish convoys were a drop in the ocean. Secondly, 
the convoys tended to take almost the same trajectory each time. As such, the same cheminots, in 
the same stations, would be the only ones to truly see what was happening. This considerably 
limits the number of cheminots who came into contact with the Jews in cattle cars. 
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Even in those cases where cheminots saw the cattle cars, their ability to get in contact with the 
deportees themselves was seriously limited. One rare testimony highlights the difficulties 
cheminots had in approaching the deportation convoys and the deportees.42 Raoul Merlin, the 
assistant chief of Compiègne station, witnessed a number of deportation convoys between 1942 
and 1944, and his account gives the clearest insight into cheminots’ roles in and perceptions of 
the event.43 By announcing the departure only a few days before the transport, the Germans 
avoided the spread of rumours which risked agitating the population. Empty freight cars were 
ordered from other depots, and cheminots had to sort through the new arrivals and choose the 
sturdiest cars to use for the convoy.44 They would assemble one locomotive, approximately 
twenty freight cars for Jews and luggage, and a few passenger cars for the security guards. They 
placed barbed wire over the windows, on order of the Germans. ‘From that point on German 
military authorities took control of the convoy, examining it closely, sometimes requesting an 
inadequate rail car to be replaced by another.’45 
 
On the day of departure itself, the convoy was brought to the ramps of the station and all of the 
doors were opened – no cheminots were allowed within close proximity of the train, only 
German or French guards. In the town a slow procession of a thousand Jews, including women 
and children, would appear walking through the silent streets, encircled by Vichy or German 
police. Once on the platform they were ordered to climb into the freight cars with their luggage 
and food parcels. With everyone compressed in the cattle cars, the doors were slammed shut and 
sealed. At this point, under SS supervision, two French cheminots, the driver and the mechanic, 
boarded the locomotive – indeed, it was illegal for non-French (Germans, Americans, etc.) to 
drive trains in French territory. The cheminots would thus start up the engine and drive the train 
until they reached the German border. At the border town of Novéant, they got off of their 
locomotive, and the convoy was handed over to Deutsche Reichsbahn railway workers who then 
drove the trains to the death camps. The Frenchmen headed back towards Paris. 
 
As the war went on, so did German presence around deportation trains, adding another layer of 
danger to any resistance activity. When preparing the convoys, cheminots were under constant 
German supervision. The two unarmed cheminots who drove the deportation convoys were 
escorted by a minimum of 16 heavily armed Germans. By 1944 a wall of sentinels would form 
around the train to make sure people did not approach it within 100 metres.46 Since there were so 
many guards involved in the deportation trains, if one of them got injured or killed in the 
sabotage – a situation which was highly likely considering the effects of railway sabotage on 
traveller trains – there was no question that brutal repression would automatically ensue. 
 
Even this small percentage of cheminots who organised, prepared and drove the convoys east 
most probably had a limited understanding of the Final Solution. The destination ‘Auschwitz’ 
meant nothing to them. The very idea of the univers concentrationnaire was unheard of. Catherine de 
Bechillon, the daughter of Henri Lang (a highly ranked SNCF engineer deported in the first 
convoy to Auschwitz), declared that even if cheminots had a clearer idea than most about what 
was happening, their knowledge remained very vague. They heard rumours of camps, saw people 
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being put into cattle cars, as well as armed German guards, and that was it. ‘Could we really stand 
up against something so mysterious?’ she asked. 47 
 
Ultimately, like the French people, most cheminots were not interested in finding out more about 
the specifics of the Jewish question. According to Bernard Le Chatelier, who worked at 
Compiègne station: ‘Spring 42, yes, I’m sure I [heard about the deportation transports of Jews]… 
Even at Compiègne we had heard some talk of this, [but] we did not know their fate, we only 
knew they were being treated in a specific way (…) Obviously, we asked ourselves [some 
questions] but life was tough enough as it was and our mind was concentrated on how we were 
going to live.’48 This reaction was not unique to the cheminots. At all levels of society, the French 
were too preoccupied by their immediate circumstances to get overly involved in the potential 
massacre happening on the other side of Europe.49 Paulette Brussière, who was a secretary in 
Paris at the time, was also reluctant to enquire about the fate of her two Jewish colleagues who 
suddenly stopped coming to work. As she explained in her interview, her daily concerns and 
struggles took up most of her time and energy, and there was little sense in asking too many 
questions in this period of occupation and supervision. 50  Robert Gildea’s term ‘shrinking 
horizons’ is particularly fitting here, as it describes how French people detached themselves from 





ASSISTANCE, SUPPORT AND THE ABSENCE OF SABOTAGE 
 
Cheminots’ horizons may have been shrinking, but they were certainly not immune to the 
deportations from France. Indeed, the cheminot press regularly called upon the chemionts to 
prevent or intervene in the deportation trains, not least those carrying forced labour workers, 
political prisoners or resisters : ‘Refuse to drive the trains of the odious relève52; ‘We will not drive 
the deportation trains!’53 Violence was even encouraged in some cases: ‘Oppose the deportations, 
refuse to drive the trains, sabotage the material’.54 And yet, no visible, uniform or organised 
manifestations of this kind have shown up in the numerous archives explored – not even in the 
case of the deportation of forced labour workers.  
 
What does emerge, however, from the archives, are innumerable acts of individual spontaneity, 
support and assistance in cases of both Jewish and non-Jewish deportations. The most 
commonly cited gesture was picking up the scraps of paper which internees slid through the 
cracks of the cattle cares as they passed through rail stations. Indeed, once the train was out of 
sight, cheminots would approach the tracks and pick up these scraps of paper on which were 
scribbled messages of hope and love.55 They would then forward them to the addresses and 
names they managed to decipher, giving people the immeasurable gift of a last word from a loved 
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one : ‘a wonderful being whom I thank with all my heart put this piece of paper in an envelope 
and sent it to Sarah’, wrote Raymonde Mann about her departure from Pithiviers to Drancy in 
the summer of 1942.56 One cheminot hurried alongside a deportation train in August 1944 to 
personally take the letter from Annie Guéhenno, a gesture which meant so much to her at the 
time, and which she was careful to remember when writing her memoirs.57 Denise Dufournier  
 
Other gestures helped alleviate the anxieties of internees. One cheminot manage to smuggle 
water to Dr Francis Rohmer, a non-Jew, who was deported from Compiègne to Dachau in July 
1944 in one of the most deadly convoys.58 The majority of these gestures were never recorded, 
and we will never be able to have a complete picture of this phenomenon. However, memoirs of 
both Jewish and non-Jewish survivors are extremely useful when trying to get a clearer picture of 
what was happening in those first moments of deportation. Whilst some of the memoirs which 
have been examined were published, most were unpublished memoirs collected at the Foundation 
pour la Mémoire de la Déportation (FMD). The memoirs conserved there were written by both 
Jewish and non-Jewish survivors were, and almost two dozen of them mentioned the infamous 
railway journeys from France to the concentration camps.59 In fact, when examining these 
memoirs held at the FMD, one is struck by the absence of any resentment towards the 
cheminots. Indeed, survivors remembered with horror the indifference and sometimes even 
cruelty of passers-by, Gendarmes, or the Germans. As the Paris-born Jew Sam Braun walked from 
Drancy to the rail station, he looked at the French gendarmes escorting them to the freight cars: 
‘a word, an explanation for their passivity would have allowed us to understand, and probably to 
accept, our fate with more resignation’.60 In contrast, they only mentioned the cheminot in 
neutral or positive contexts. In fact, in all the survivor memoirs I have come across, there is a 
visible absence of criticism when it comes to the cheminots’ roles in deportations. 
 
Gestures of support from the cheminots are further confirmed in Jewish convoys. In 1943, there 
were fifteen escape attempts on the Jewish convoys from 9, 11 and 13 February, nine of which 
were successful.61  Escape attempts infuriated the Germans. First, they caused delays to the train 
schedule. Second, they undermined the effectiveness of German authority and security. After 
three consecutive reports gave details of the escapes in February, they began to elaborate new 
plans for the organisation and preparation of the trains. Overall, the intensification of security 
measures considerably worsened the conditions of deportation. Passengers were separated from 
their luggage so they could not retrieve tools to help them escape. Because men showed more 
audacity, they decided to mix the men with women and children rather than divide them in the 
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transports. Moreover, all deportees were searched before boarding the cars. German guards were 
supplied with more weapons, which they were given the freedom to use when they deemed it 
necessary. They were also expected to seal the cars from the outside, and to only open them 
upon arrival.62 
 
But within the German reports, French railway workers were also directly accused of assisting 
Jews in their escape attempts.63 By slowing down the trains at crucial points – at night time, near 
a forest – or by loosening floorboards in the convoys, cheminots were criticised for giving 
internees opportunities to jump from the moving convoy. 64  The Germans threatened the 
cheminots with severe reprisals, and also implemented new measures to prevent any kind of 
indirect assistance to the deportees. Those who prepared the convoys had to make sure that the 
freight cars were sturdy, and that no floorboards could be loosened. As for the cheminots who 
drove the trains to the German border, they were forbidden to slow the train at nightfall. These 
very accusations are confirmed in testimonies. Bernard Le Chatelier recounted that ‘the mécanicien 
and the chauffeur tried to organise a break down; and in particular, in my train they organised a 
rupture d’attelage which brought the train to a full stop, and allowed five or six guys who had dug at 
the floorboards to escape.’65 The deportee Guy Domalan further commented that ‘the cheminots 
loosened floorboards that prisoners could then break themselves’.66 
 
Of course, not all of the escape attempts can be explained through cheminot intervention; once 
again, one is reminded of the importance of Jewish self-reliance for survival. Abram Frydland, 
who successfully escaped from convoy n°46 on 9 February 1943, had smuggled a small saw onto 
the train. Once the train had set off, he and some friends furiously sawed at the floorboards until 
they managed to make a hole big enough to slip through. They then waited until nightfall before 
taking the big leap off the train. Abram was the only one who made it to freedom; the others 
were caught, and either shot or put back on the train.67 
 
Moreover, not all deportees were necessarily looking to escape the convoys, and tensions could 
even arise when people in the same car would debate whether or not to try and escape. Whilst 
some saw an escape attempt as the obvious choice, others were very concerned with the harsh 
reprisals that may affect the other deportees. Indeed, German guards were allowed to engage in 
violent repressions when escapes were attempted along the journey. Escapees were often shot 
immediately, whilst those in the cattle cars suffered intense humiliations. After Dr Lohéac’s car 
was damaged by deportees attempting to undo the floorboards, the train was stopped and the 
deportees inside the car were made to descend from the train. They were ordered to take off all 
of their clothes, to take their food and descend from the train with their hands in the air: ‘On the 
platform were fifty-five prisoners in Indian file, completely naked, both arms up in the air, with 
one hand gripping the bread and the other the saucisson: shivering from cold and emotion, we 
would have looked ridiculous, had the reality not been so tragic.’68 They were then pushed into 
other already-crammed freight cars. This was not an exceptional occurrence and other deportees 
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would be faced to suffer similar humiliation and trauma.69 It is perhaps not so surprising, 
therefore, that escape attempts were heavily debated by deportees themselves. Annie Guéhenno 
was one of those fervent believers that escaping from the convoy was necessary in order to avoid 
an intolerable fate. However the other women ganged up on her to prevent her from escaping.70 
Similarly, Alfred Blum and Joseph Silber recounted how when they deported in April 1943, they 
had to knock out the elected ‘leader’ of their cattle car in order to go through with their escape 
plan.71 
 
Chances for assistance at the moment of deportation were thus slim, and those for actual rescue 
even smaller; aid and support were more effectively given before arrests, and cheminots were 
part of these networks. Historians frequently stumble across such incidents in their own research, 
and when added together, these ‘anecdotes’ make quite a sizeable list of individual acts. Deville 
hid Jews who were looking to cross the demarcation line; Nouvion helped Jews cross the line, 
find refuge, jobs and false papers; Léon Bronchart also hid Jews on his locomotive and helped 
them obtain false papers. César Chamy sang the praises of the cheminots in general for having 
helped smuggle Jews on trains. 72  Thus cheminots, who were so often passeurs, had many 
opportunities to meet and help Jews on the run.73  
 
The gestures of support and assistance provided by cheminots were not, however, necessarily 
disinterested. When Weill accepted the invitation of one cheminot who offered to take him in for 
the night, he woke up to find the cheminot in question crawling into his bed.74 Likewise, not all 
cheminots participated in efforts to help the deportees – even when it just meant picking up 
scraps of paper fallen from the convoys. Dureux, the chef de gare principal adjoint, picked up the tiny 
notes destined to loved ones only to hand them over to the authorities, ‘this of his own initiative, 
without any pressure from the boches,’ explained one of his colleagues.75 Such incidents are a 
strong reminder that it is impossible to generalise cheminot behaviours. There were far too many 
workers, far too many personalities, characters and inclinations to create a homogenous picture.  
 
If small gestures of support and assistance to persecuted Jews are scattered throughout memoirs, 
testimonies and archives, the sabotage of Jewish convoys is noticeably absent. As Michael Marrus 
and Robert Paxton noted in 1981, and as Annie Kriegel reiterated in 1984, why did railway 
workers sabotage so many German military transports, but never the Jewish convoys?76 This 
question is fully explored in other publications, yet some main points merit mention at this 
stage.77 First, it was a matter of cheminot professionalism. Indeed, far from being natural-born 
saboteurs, cheminots were historically reluctant to engage in railway sabotage. Whereas workers 
in the late-nineteenth century were encouraged to engage in industrial sabotage, cheminots 
considered that railway sabotage was far too serious and dangerous. Cheminots did not want to 
see the destruction of their material, their trains, their locomotives. They were also only too 
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aware that when dealing with railway materials and machines so large and imposing, sabotage 
seriously endangered the lives of both colleagues and travellers. Sabotaging German materials 
was thus a very different matter, since the convoys did not carry travellers within them. Also, 
there is no evidence that cheminots were necessarily the authors of railway sabotage: many of 
them could be – and were – triggered by people outside the railways. 
 
The second main reason not to sabotage deportation trains was that the atmosphere of this 
period was extremely tense, and the fear of repression widespread. Not only were deportation 
trains intensely supervised, but a wave of repression hit the cheminot milieu particularly hard 
from 1943 onwards, as more and more cheminots were shot, taken hostage and/or deported to 
the camps.78 This atmosphere of fear and repression made large rescue operations or active 
forms of resistance less likely in highly-supervised spaces. Not only that, but the somewhat 
mysterious fate of the deportees should not be disregarded: there was no firm knowledge that 
Jewish men, women and children were being gassed upon arrival to Auschwitz. 
 
Finally, one must consider the overall usefulness of sabotaging deportation trains. Indeed, the 
link between railway sabotage and Jewish rescue is even more tenuous when you consider a 
broad historical perspective. Sabotaging or bombing the instruments of the Final Solution 
(camps, ghettos, convoys, railway tracks) was not as useful as one might initially think. By 
sabotaging railway tracks heading east, the Allies were not rescuing anyone ; rather, they were 
delaying the transport by several hours or even days, thereby prolonging the agony inside the 
convoys. One non-Jewish deportation train which left France for Auschwitz in July 1944 was 
delayed by these bombings, and over 500 people died in those rail cars.79 In her memoirs, Simone 
Veil described how the bombing of Mathausen frightened those internees which it did not kill. 80  
When Jan Karski related his conversation with the Jewish Polish resistance in 1942 in his 
memoirs, he declared that, according to these resisters, it was too late to bomb the camps, and 
too late to bomb the railway lines. If anything was to be done, it was to completely wipe out 
Germany.81 This does not mean that bombing or sabotage were not powerful symbols, but if the 
explosion of the crematorium in Auschwitz and the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto  were acts of 
courage and resistance, they were not acts of rescue as such. 
 
The absence of sabotage in both Jewish and non-Jewish deportation trains should not 
overshadow the existence of numerous gestures of humanism, assistance and rescue, and 
cheminots’ gestures towards deportees raise important points. First, that those cheminots who 
assisted, helped and supported men, women and children on the run or facing deportation, did 
so regardless if they were Jewish or not. Even if they knew about cases of Jewish persecution, 
they mostly understood this within a broader phenomenon of the persecution of French people 
or workers.  Second, these gestures were made possible because of the proximity of the cheminot 
to the deportation process. As previously mentioned, the cheminots were not as closely tied to 
the deportation process as is often imagined; but their physical circumstances meant that some 
actions, whether through a resistance network or through individual action, were possible. This 
confirms the comments of Christian Chevandier, who stated that the support cheminots gave 
Jews was often linked to circumstance and opportunity: ‘as workers on the railway, they had a 
different (but not unlimited) access to deportees, goods and materials.’ 82 Finally, cheminot 
gestures show the limits of rescue. Indeed, behind a rescuer sat a network of individuals, a 
mountain of logistical concerns, a set of complex moral questions, and an extremely sensitive 
geo-political situation, all of which played a key role in the successful (or not) rescue operations. 
As the next section will show, non-cheminots were the ones who led those rare rescue operations 
on deportation trains, individuals who had far better access to these networks, resources and 
connections than ordinary railwaymen. 
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Cheminots’ reluctance to actively rescue Jewish (and non-Jewish) deportees at the time of 
deportation is a reflection of broader societal issues, not least an apprehension to approach and 
intervene in the highly-supervised deportation convoys. Indeed, cases of rescue or resistance on 
moving trains transporting hundreds of people  are incredibly rare in the archives, and not just in 
France. One reason, as mentioned earlier, was because of the lack of a specific understanding of 
the deportees’ fate. Another reasons was the limited opportunities to approach and effectively 
intervene in the deportation convoys. Linked to this second reason, stopping/intervening with a 
moving train was a massive logistical operation which cheminots alone could not so easily 
undertake. As this final section will show, the two known rescue operations to save deportees 
were undertaken by people with far greater connections and resources than an ordinary train 
driver – it was not enough to know the railway milieu. 
 
Two incidents in France and Belgium reveal the full complexities of rescue during deportation. 
This first is the case of the XXth Jewish convoy in Belgium, when in April 1943 three Jewish 
resisters decided to stop the deportation train en route to Auschwitz. When they initially 
suggested this idea to their resistance network, it was dismissed : not only was it far too 
dangerous considering the risk of repression, but furthermore the rescue of Jews was not a 
priority within the Belgian resistance. These three men thus had to act alone, and on 19 April 
1943 they managed to bring the convoy to a halt by flashing a red light and open some of the 
carriage doors. Their intervention allowed 231 of the 1631 Jews inside the train to escape from 
the convoy, although many were eventually caught and only 100 of them actually escaped death.83 
The operation was never repeated, and deportations to Auschwitz continued until July 1944. 
 
The second case, which took place in France, is an entirely different operation altogether, and 
although it was aimed at both Jewish and non-Jewish deportees, only a selection of non-Jewish 
deportees managed to be saved. This story is set in the summer of 1944, and involved the last 
deportations from Paris. The main character of this story is Raoul Nordling, the Swedish consul 
in Paris. According to the historian Fabrice Virgili, it was Nordling’s furious energy and 
dedication which saved dozens of people from deportation.84 This story is told mostly from 
Nordling’s perspective, which naturally taints the objectivity of these exact events. Still, the 
emphasis on bureaucracy and logistics, as well as the geo-political factors at play, are very 
revealing. 
 
By the summer of 1944, rumours were spreading that Allied troops would liberate Paris at any 
moment. Although similar rumours had previously proven unreliable, this time, things were 
different: Parisians in the streets were whistling more gaily than usual, and Germans were 
beginning to fear the worst. Nordling was not oblivious to these changes. But one incident in 
particular moved him to act. On 6 August 1944, one of the more lenient German judges with 
whom Nordling was acquainted warned him about the tragic events which were soon to take 
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place: all French prisoners would either be killed by the Gestapo, or killed…. Nordling was 
deeply shaken by this, since a close family relative had been in Fresnes prison for over a year.85 
 
The Swedish consul began his ambitious mission by using a diplomatic route, and he contacted 
Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in Paris. The latter listened attentively to Nordling’s 
argument: ‘Given the current state of affairs (...), any abuse of power from the Germans would 
only worsen their situation, whereas any humane gesture on their part could be brought in their 
favour.’86 Abetz advised the Swede to address his subordinate, Hofman, who had a reputation for 
being quite amiable. However, Hofman proved useless. He told Nordling that the embassy was 
not allowed to make such decisions, and that Himmler was the only one with any real power. As 
such, Nordling should consult Oberg.87  
 
Nordling was suddenly going down a bureaucratic and administrative maze which risked taking 
weeks before anything could be sorted out. By that point, it would probably be too late. The 
clock was ticking: the Americans were approaching Paris, and the Germans were fleeing with 
prisoners. On 11 August, Nordling decided to move things along by adding new pressures. The 
director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure had just been imprisoned for refusing to reveal which 
students were affiliated to resistance groups. Seizing this opportunity, Nordling went straight to 
Laval’s collaborators, hoping to pull some strings. He quickly obtained the support of Cardinal 
Suhard, a very influential figure at the time, and then met with Laval himself on 14 August 1944 
to tell him about the horror of the deportations:88  
 
About 120 men, women and children were packed into a freight car. 
They had to remain standing up with nothing to eat or drink; women 
gave birth en route, and the journey could last up to 6 days. Nobody 
was allowed off so they relieved themselves in the freight cars. 
[Moreover] the evacuation of the camps was going so slowly that we 
had every reason to fear that the Allies would arrive before their 
departure, so the Germans would simply shoot all the remaining 
prisoners.89 
 
Laval agreed that these were unacceptable conditions. He approached Abetz and Oberg himself, 
and both assured him that measures were already being carried out to rectify this problem: there 
were less people packed into individual freight cars, the Red Cross was allowed to approach the 
convoy to distribute goods amongst the prisoners, and the ill were placed in a more spacious car 
attached to each train.90  
 
Nordling’s aim was not to improve conditions of deportation, but to place the camps and prisons 
under the authority of the Red Cross. Nordling therefore approached Abtez and Oberg again, 
and put a special emphasis on the prison of Fresnes which was being evacuated. He drove madly 
around Paris, between prisons, camps and government buildings in order to avoid the 
deportation or death of French civilian prisoners. A main obstacle was Dietrich Von Choltitz, the 
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German military governor.91 The latter disregarded most of Nordling’s arguments by claiming 
that these were not civilian prisoners, but in fact prisoners of war. They thus belonged to the 
German army. He told Nordling that whatever had been discussed with Oberg and the SS was 
useless. The only institution with any real power was the German Army, which he represented 
himself.  In his memoirs, the Swedish consul underlines that, despite difficult encounters 
between the two men, the Nazi was not oblivious to Nordling’s requests. A mutual respect had 
established itself between the two men. Therefore, in the end they both agreed to a general truce 
which would last over 24 hours, starting 19 August 1944: the Nordling-Von Choltitz Accord. 
However, this ‘accord’ was never fully respected, and fighting between resisters and Germans 
started up again on 22 August 1944. On that day, Nordling suffered a heart attack. 
 
Nordling’s efforts had mixed results. On 17 August, women and sick prisoners were liberated 
from Fresnes prison. At another prison, the caserne de Tourelles, where there were French guards 
on duty, all prisoners were released. At Romainville, Nordling was unable to liberate the 60 
female prisoners, but did manage to station two Red Cross nurses there. Unfortunately, the 
operations to save the Jews in Drancy failed completely. Nordling was unable to prevent the 
departure of Jewish deportees on 17 August 1944, and the convoy left Drancy with Aloïs 
Brunner at its head. The only minor redeeming feature was the fact that the remaining prisoners 
in Drancy did receive extra food rations afterwards. Other failures concerned non-Jewish 
deportations : Nordling made no progress at Compiègne, where 2400 people were still 
imprisoned and on 18 August when more than 1200 prisoners were deported to Buchenwald. 
 
Nordling did, however, manage to stop the last convoy to leave Compiègne on 26 August before 
it reached the German border. The details of this rescue mission, also known as ‘l’arrêt des 
cheminots’ to some, were revealed in Jean Habert’s testimony. Habert was an SNCF employee at 
the time, working at the Rosières station. On the morning of 26 August, he had received a phone 
call: ‘Due to the accord between the high German authorities and the consulate of Sweden, it is 
necessary to delay the transport n°….’92 The message stated that the train could not cross the 
Somme river, at which point the Nordling-Von Choltitz accord became invalid. When Habert 
realised that this train was carrying about 300 prisoners, he understood the urgency of the matter. 
He alerted the German station master who worked alongside him, only to discover that the train 
had just been redirected towards Péronne-Chapelette. Habert called the station and informed 
them that they had to stop the train because a diplomatic accord had been signed. As the clock 
ticked, French and German cheminots worked side by side to ensure that the orders were carried 
out. Eventually, Habert found out that the train had successfully been stopped at Péronne-
Chapelette. 
 
There are several things to point out about this incident. First, Nordling’s order alone did not 
stop the train. Indeed, Habert’s testimony indicates that the train may have been stopped for 
other reasons: ‘[one cheminot] supposes that the bridge over the Somme had been destroyed, 
and that the presence of German authorities was pure luck.’93 Numerous testimonies from the 
villagers of Péronne also support this argument. Guy Savary stated that massive bombardments 
had hit Péronne-Chapelette in August so that the train station and civilian homes around it were 
completely destroyed, and the bridge was in an irreparable state.94 Second, when the train 
stopped, the prisoners were not put into the care of the Red Cross, let alone liberated: they were 
walked into an ex-prisoner of war camp where the SS and the Wehrmacht continued to guard 
them in uncomfortable conditions for several days.95 Testimonies from the townspeople, such as 
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Mme Loones, Pierre Malthieu, Jacques Martel and Raymonde Moussot, indicate that many 
prisoners remained in Péronne, even after the Americans had liberated the town. They were 
accommodated by hospitable villagers for several days, until it was possible to find a way to 
return home.96 
 
But the most important conclusion to draw from the story of the last deportation train is just 
how complicated it was to successfully prevent a deportation train from travelling to Germany. 
Indeed, if anything Jean Habert’s title l’arrêt des cheminots is highly misleading – in no way was this 
the single-handed act of the cheminots. The circumstances for this incident were here unique: it 
was the end of the Occupation; the Germans were under serious pressure; Nordling had a huge 
energy but also excellent contacts; the railway workers were able to act fast and participate in this 
final operation. It is undoubtedly the most successful operation of deportees being saved from 
the convoys – even the operation in Belgium had limited success due to the fact that so many 
escapees were subsequently caught and deported. And overall, it reminds us that intervening in 
deportation convoys themselves to rescue Jews (and non-Jews) required more than just technical 








Bronchart’s refusal to drive a Jewish convoy is not only a misrepresentation of the historical 
reality, – it contained political prisoners rather than Jews – but it is also an overly simplistic 
example of actions which cheminots could have, and did, undertake to help Jews and other 
deportees. In fact, Bronchart’s stand was, if anything, merely symbolic and inconclusive, since he 
was swiftly replaced by another driver. Not only that, but Bronchart’s ‘refusal’ was completely 
uncommon amongst the cheminot community.97 In contrast, his assistance to the Rosenbergs, 
and to the man he hid in his locomotive, is evocative of the gestures of assistance, support and 
rescue which cheminots carried out at various levels. 
 
As such, Bronchart’s story is not really one of rescue during the deportations, but one of 
contemporary expectations of rescue, and of the desire to draw moral lessons from history. 
Behind it lies an assumption that the Jewish convoys could have been stopped, something which 
is not completely new. Since the postwar period, there have been many questions about why the 
Allies did not bomb the tracks to Auschwitz, so much so that the Unites States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum now explains the reasons on its website.98 Most historians would agree that 
such comments are short-sighted, as they overlook the intensity of the historical realities at the 
time. Not only that, but they reduce Holocaust crimes to railway deportation; in reality, the 
Holocaust was committed in many spaces beyond the railways and the camps themselves.99 
 
This article has aimed to step away from the monopoly of the Bronchart story and explore the 
historical reality of railwaymen, rescue and the deportation trains. It explored the wider historical 
context(s) which framed the history of rescue in Vichy France, not least that of the cheminot 
                                                            
96 Archives Péronne: Testimonies of M. Malthieu, M. Martel, M. Sacary, Mme Leroux, Mme Loones and 
Mme Moussot are all held in the archives of the Town Hall in Péronne. 
97 It is hard to know with real exactness who was being deported. Some Jewish deportation trains did, after 
all, pass through Montauban. However, a close analysis of Gerard Gobitz’s book which higlighted railway 
trajectories suggests that there was no such passage on 31 October 1942.  
98 ‘The United States and the Holocaust: Why Auschwitz was not bombed’, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008041.  
99 This is emphasised in recent publications notably Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: the destruction of the Jewish 
community in Jedwabne (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire : 
Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Penguin Books, 2009); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between 
Hitler and Stalin (London: Bodley Head, 2010). 
community. The extent of their knowledge and understanding of Jewish specificity was 
questioned, and placed within a larger context of French awareness of the Holocaust. Moreover, 
their professional and traditional values were mentioned to highlight their reluctance to sabotage 
transports carrying any travellers altogether, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, deportees or non-
deportees. Still, this does not mean that cheminots were indifferent to the fate of deportees, nor 
that they did not participate in individual acts of assistance or even in networks of rescue. Indeed, 
railway workers could help Jews on the run or give them some support through humane gestures 
– but interfering with the trains themselves was not as easy as is traditionally assumed, and the 
dangers associated with it were deemed too serious to be ignored. This was true of the Jewish 
deportation convoys, but also of non-Jewish deportations. By shifting our gaze to examine the 
actual rescue operations which did take place during the deportations, we are reminded that 
technical knowledge was not enough to prevent deportation trains from running, and that 
effective rescue operations required far more elaborate preparations and interventions than ones 
which cheminots could offer.  
 
Cheminots are not central to the history of rescue in the Holocaust – and yet, their involvement 
with the deportations, their interactions with Jews and their reluctance to sabotage the convoys 
do give us greater insight into the complexities of Jewish rescue in the Second World War. 
Indeed, the decision to help Jews was not always obvious, and many circumstantial and societal 
factors came into play. Even when non-Jews rescued Jews, these plans were often part of 
broader patterns of humanitarian action or organised resistance. The case of the cheminots thus 
highlights the extent to which ordinary people in Western Europe were entangled with the Final 
Solution, but reminds us that there is no clear moral lesson behind this.  
 
